Thomas Jungbauer, Cornell University
Assistant Professor
Ithaca, New York
jungbauer@cornell.edu
Office:
(607) 255-2501
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Bio/Research
Professor Jungbauer applies microeconomic theory to study welfare implications of allocation mechanisms in two-sided economies with prices. His research focuses on the conduct and performance of high-skill labor markets and the distribution of surplus among market participants. Since markets for ...
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Bio/Research
Professor Jungbauer applies microeconomic theory to study welfare implications of allocation mechanisms in two-sided economies with prices. His research focuses on the conduct and performance of high-skill labor markets and the distribution of surplus among market participants. Since markets for specialists are typically small, strategic behavior of both firms and workers deserve explicit consideration. In his work Professor Jungbauer shows that asymmetry with respect to firm size does not only pose distributional challenges due to market power but also potentially leads to inefficiencies. Currently he analyzes the effects of worker complementarity and the hiring timeline (simultaneous vs. sequential hiring) on market efficiency and surplus distribution. Understanding the mechanics of specialist labor markets is not only essential from society’s viewpoint and a regulatory perspective, but crucial for firms’ hiring policies as well as workers’ decisions about investing into human capital and specialty choice. His work also extends to internal labor market dynamics and promotion tournaments.
While his primary research centers on high-skill labor markets, he is similarly interested in other bilateral coordination problems with and without prices. Important examples are labor markets in general, donor organ allocation and the matching of customers with airline seats. His previous work in economic theory critically reviews predictions of strategic games under fundamental uncertainty and suggests an alternative approach mirroring the concept of rationalizable strategies under risk. In another project, he underlines the significance of temporal flexibility of contribution schemes in public goods provision when agents aspire towards matching their peers’ welfare rather than maximizing their utility.
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While his primary research centers on high-skill labor markets, he is similarly interested in other bilateral coordination problems with and without prices. Important examples are labor markets in general, donor organ allocation and the matching of customers with airline seats. His previous work in economic theory critically reviews predictions of strategic games under fundamental uncertainty and suggests an alternative approach mirroring the concept of rationalizable strategies under risk. In another project, he underlines the significance of temporal flexibility of contribution schemes in public goods provision when agents aspire towards matching their peers’ welfare rather than maximizing their utility.
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